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STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 970216-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
REPLY REGARDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 3 is, as to the specific factors the Court of 
Appeals directed the District Court to consider, a question of 
law. Those factors are "actual land use" and whether the zoning 
body perpetuated the prior zoning designation of Washington 
County. Kunz v. State. 913 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah App. 1996). The 
primacy of these factors is established by this Court's specific 
identification of these factors, and by this Court's instruction 
to the District Court to address them. The consequence of the 
1 
District Court's failure to follow this Court's specific 
directive is a question of law, reviewable without deference to 
the District Court's determination. Slattery v. Covey & Co., 
Inc.. 909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995). 
Issue No. 4, relating to the District Court's explicit 
disregard of the controlling section of law as essentially 
unworkable, is also a question of law. Id. 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether the three 
billboards are in an area "zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) 
(1995). But to decide that question, this Court directed the 
District Court to consider "not just the stated purpose of the 
zoning body" but certain specific factors. Kunz. 913 P.2d at 
769. The only two factors this Court specifically required the 
District Court to consider were "actual land use" and any 
evidence the zoning body perpetuated the Washington County zoning 
classification, which under Kunz would leave the area unlawful 
for signs. id. Those two factors must, by virtue of their 
specification, be the dominant considerations in deciding the 
2 
ultimate issue. Those two factors are discussed in UDOT's 
opening brief. 
Less specifically, this Court directed consideration of all 
evidence "relevant" to the ultimate question of whether the area 
is within the phrase "areas zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-
136.3(3) (1995). Id. The most salient evidence to this end, 
beyond the two primary factors just noted, is the evidence that 
Mr. Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were on and the 
person who would benefit financially by addition of the small 
area of the signs to the area annexed and zoned commercial by 
Toquerville in December of 1993, was the single moving force 
without whom that particular portion of the annexed property 
would not have been included in the Toquerville annexation and 
zoning to commercial. Appellant's Br. at 30-32. This Eveleth 
land that would not have been annexed and zoned commercial absent 
Eveleth's involvement is in the aberrant bump at the top of the 
map constituting Kunz's Addendum No. 5. 
The tax revenues from the signs, the only commercial 
enterprise there has ever been in this area, is also 
3 
significantly relevant. This is so because this Court recognized 
that "the legislature must have contemplated that local zoning 
bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from lands 
adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow outdoor 
advertising" (Kunz. 913 P.2d at 769), and therefore directed the 
District Court to look beyond "the stated purpose of the zoning 
body or local government" to more objective factors. Id. 
The signs were illegal under the February, 1993 UDOT Remand 
Order this Court held governed Kunz by res judicata, igi. at 769-
770. That is relevant to counter Kunz's claim that the signs 
were only "non-conforming" and not illegal,1 and hence need not 
comply with Toquerville or State requirements for new signs.2 • 
lMThe term 'illegally erected1 or 'illegally maintained1 is 
not synonymous with the term, 'nonconforming sign', nor is a sign 
with 'grandfather' status synonymous with the term, 
'nonconforming sign.'" Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3(14) (1994). 
2UDOT can require Kunz to comply with the Toquerville 
ordinance as well as State law as a condition to the issuance of 
State sign permits based on a ruling of this Court in another 
sign case: 
The State certainly has inherent authority to identify 
an existing requirement of law and make it a condition 
to the granting of a permit or lease. The application 
of an existing requirement of law is not equivalent to 
imposing new conditions not otherwise required by law. 
4 
Kunz does not rebut the centrally relevant and dispositive 
facts UDOT marshaled in its opening brief in support of the 
conclusion that the area where the signs stood is within the 
phrase, "areas zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising." Kunz's brief does discuss why Toquerville did not 
zone certain other areas commercial, but that is not the 
question. More generally, Kunz's brief rambles through large 
amounts of matter irrelevant to the ultimate issue. 
At page 4 of its brief, Kunz lumps Eveleth i11 with a group 
of owners as initiators of the annexation. That is an attempt to 
gloss the specific testimony given by the annexing coordinator 
that the request of Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were 
on, was the reason for the annexation of that particular small 
area and that without his request that portion would not have 
been added. (R. 855-56, 876; see also Appellant's Br. at 30-32). 
Though Kunz showed that there had been some potential 
interest in commercial development "of property right on the 
Anderson Junction 1-15 Interchange," (Appellee's Br. at 4-5), it 
did not show any "actual land use" as commercial. Further, Kunz 
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. ROA General, 927 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
5 
failed to show any interest at all in commercial development in 
the area where the signs are, 2,000 to 3,000 feet from the 
interchange (R. 1024-25), up a rural frontage road. (R. 1004). 
Kunz claims that "a majority of town residents" and "most 
residents" favored creation of a commercial zone. Appellee's Br. 
at 5. There was, of course, no testimony from "a majority of 
town residents" or "most residents." Moreover, the record 
references Kunz supplies do not show that any witness even says 
that "a majority" or "most" residents favored such creation. 
Further, Kunz's assertion, Appellee's Br. at 5, that owners of 
property "on the intersection desired [a commercial] designation 
to accommodate future commercial development plans, . . . and tax 
base benefits" does not reasonably relate to the area of the 
signs, the closest of which was 2,000 feet away. (R. 1024-25.) 
Kunz concedes that the zoning designation of Washington 
County was considered. Appellee's Br. at 5. The testimony of 
Mayor Wahlquist goes much further and shows that Toquerville 
perpetuated that designation,3 which this Court held was illegal 
for signs based on the final UDOT Order on Remand. Kunz, 913 
3R. 985; Appellant's Br. at 28. 
6 
P.2d 969-70. 
The statement of Kunz that "there was never any discussion 
of the outdoor advertising signs as justification for a Highway 
Commercial (H.C.) Zoning designation" is typical of Kunz's 
unsupported and unsupportable generalizations. Appellee's Br. at 
6. The record reference Kunz supplies shows one person saying he 
had not heard discussion of the signs at the meetings he 
attended. 
The supposed "fact" that "the current Toquerville zoning 
ordinance did not address outdoor advertising specifically," 
Appellee's Br. at 6, is simply not a fact. The Toquerville sign 
ordinance was adopted in 1982 (R. 957), in effect at the time of 
the Toquerville annexation and zoning (R. 984), placed into 
evidence at the remand trial as Kunz•s Exhibit 2, and attached to 
Kunz's brief as Addendum 6. And that ordinance bars any sign 
larger than 8 feet x 12 feet and any sign without a conditional 
use permit. There must have been some lapse in communication in 
the portion of colloquy between Mr. Ronnow and the witness 
reported at R. 911-12 with regard to the existence or non-
existence of a Toquerville sign ordinance. This is shown later 
7 
in that colloquy where Mr. Ronnow himself refers that witness to 
Toquerville1s "sign ordinance." (R. 928, 11 2.) 
What Kunz refers to as "the zoning map" (p. 6) was an 
"interim zoning map" that was never formalized into a final 
document. (R. 981) Kunz's characterization of the "SIGNS" 
portion of the Toquerville ordinance is a completely nonsensical 
blurring of what that sign ordinance plainly means. The sign 
ordinance (Appellee's Br., Addendum 6 at 29) reflects the 
requirements for a sign in Toquerville. These requirements are 
that an advertising sign is limited to 8 x 12 feet in size and 18 
feet in height, must have a conditional use permit, and is 
limited to indirect lighting. Mr. Ronnow and the witness 
demonstrated their understanding that this ordinance requires a 
conditional use permit, in the following exchange: 
MR. RONNOW: 
Q. Based on the H-C ordinance, the highway 
commercial ordinance we've been discussing and 
provisions therein, and the chapter 12 sign ordinance, 
Toquerville's zoning ordinance that we're now 
discussing, can an applicant seek a conditional use 
permit in highway commercial for an advertising sign" 
A. Yes, sir. 
(R. 929, 11 9-15) . 
The District Court was indisputably correct in its 
8 
recognition that it was the intent of the Toquerville sign 
ordinance that "any signage of the type involved in this 
litigation be permissible only by conditional use permit." (R. 
768, H 8). The District Court was indisputably incorrect in 
basing its judgment on the premise that conditional use permits 
must have been obtained for the signs because placement of the 
signs "could only be done by conditional use permit,"4 when no 
evidence of conditional use permits had been submitted. 
, REPLY TO CERTAIN ASSERTIONS IN KUNZ'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
UDOT replies here to some of Kunz's assertions in its 
Summary of Arguments. First, UDOT's brief marshals evidence in 
its statement of facts and discussion of discrete issues. 
Administrative Rule R933-2-3(4) (1994) clarifies Utah Code 
Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) and makes an area illegal for 
billboards where, as here, the "primary activity" on the land is 
outdoor advertising. This Court directed the District Court to 
consider all relevant evidence bearing on whether the area is 
zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and 
Kunz approvingly quotes the District Court's declaration that its 
4(R. 769, I 10) . 
9 
inquiry was to have "extremely broad horizons." (R. 842; 
Appellee's Br. at 22). Thereupon Kunz submitted in evidence in 
the remand trial and the District Court accepted, Kunz's Exhibit 
2, the Toquerville ordinance, which had never been introduced 
before in this case. Now, Kunz objects to UDOT's submission, at 
that same remand trial, of Administrative Rule R933-2-3(4) (1994) 
and UDOT's argument thereon. (R. 708-09.) The administrative 
rule is no less relevant than the Toquerville sign ordinance and 
should not be excluded from consideration. 
Kunz is incorrect that UDOT did not make this argument 
regarding the rule, below. (See R. 708--"R933-2-3(4) of the Utah 
Administrative Code clarifies the definition in Utah Code Ann. § 
27-12-136.3(3) (1995) that was otherwise considered ambiguous . . 
. .") This argument will be further developed below. 
The list of "factors" Kunz claims the District Court 
considered does not support the District Court's findings or 
judgment. This will be treated below. 
The Court's reasoning did not logically support the 
findings, and the relevant facts in the record require reversal. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS JUDGMENT ON THE 
EXISTENCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS FOR THE 
SIGNS, AND IN SO DOING COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR 
Kunz refuses to acknowledge the fact that the trial court 
gave as its reason for concluding that the signs were not in an 
area zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising, "the fact that the placement of advertising signs 
within the Eveleth property after Toquerville annexed and zoned 
the subject property could only be done by conditional use 
permit." (R. 769, % 10). This finding is clear error and 
invalidates the judgment. First, such a fact has no bearing on 
whether the signs are in an area zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising. Second, the supposed "fact" is a 
non-fact. There was no evidence of conditional use permits for 
the signs and there could not have been any because the signs 
were in violation of the 8 x 12 foot size requirement of the 
Toquerville ordinance. Appellee's Br., Addendum 6. 
The signs were illegal under the February 1993 UDOT Order on 
Remand, by res judicata. Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769. The signs were 
also "illegal and subject to removal" on a separate basis. Id. 
11 
at 770. As "illegal" signs, the signs were not "non-conforming" 
and were subject to Toquerville's (and the State's) requirements 
for new signs.5 
Kunz's refusal to acknowledge the District Court's repeated 
reference to the Toquerville ordinance's requirement of 
"conditional use permits" for the signs as the basis for its 
decision6 is a statement by Kunz that the sun is not shining 
while it sees it shine. This is a variation of Kunz's refusal to 
acknowledge that Toquerville has a sign ordinance that requires 
conditional use permits. Kunz's counsel and witness know better: 
MR. RONNOW: 
Q: Based on the H-C ordinance, the highway 
commercial ordinance we've been discussing and 
provisions therein, and the chapter 12 sign ordinance, 
Toquerville's zoning ordinance that we're now 
discussing, can an applicant seek a conditional use 
permit in highway commercial for an advertising sign? 
A. Yes, sir. 
R. 929, 11 9-15. 
5One cannot help but wonder whether the fact that 
Toquerville's legal counsel has been a partner in the same firm 
as that of Kunz's counsel from the time of the Toquerville 
annexation and zoning to the present has anything to do with 
Toquerville's lack of enforcement of the Toquerville sign 
ordinance. 
6(R. 768-69, H1 8 and 10). 
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As noted above, the planner to whom Kunz refers at page 13, 
Mr. Sizemore, apparently had some lapse in communication with 
Kunz's counsel at the trial regarding the Toquerville sign 
ordinance, for the irrefutable fact is that Toquerville did have 
a sign ordinance. (See Kunz's Exhibit 2 at trial and Addendum 6 
attached to its brief.) That there may have been an intention to 
amend it (never implemented) (R. 933) does not cancel its 
existence. Again, Kunz focuses on reasons not to zone certain 
other areas "commercial." That does not rebut the evidence UDOT 
marshaled in its opening brief showing that the area of the signs 
is an area zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising. 
II. UDOT MARSHALED THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS 
Issue No. 1 relates to the Court's reliance on a non-
existent fact, irrelevant to the ultimate issue. It is 
philosophically impossible for UDOT to prove a negative -- that 
the fact does not exist. All UDOT need do is show that the lower 
court based its ruling on a supposed fact and then observe that 
there is no evidence in the record of the existence of that fact. 
Kunz has had its opportunity to show the existence of that fact 
13 
and has not done so. The non-existent fact on which the court 
rested was the supposed existence of conditional use permits for 
the signs. There being no evidence of such permits and such 
evidence being irrelevant, the findings fail to "show that the 
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence,'" as required by Acton v. Deliran. 
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
As to issue No. 3, the trial court's entry of judgment 
without regard to the specific factors the Court of Appeals 
directed it to consider is a question of law. Slattery v. Covey 
& Co. . Inc. , 909 P. 2d 925 (Utah App. 1995) . UDOT has, in any 
case, marshaled the evidence showing the trial court's clear 
error in disregarding the dispositive evidence. Issue No. 4, the 
trial court's dismissal as impracticable of the statute this 
Court identified as controlling, is a question of law. Id. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE R933-2-3(4) RENDERS THE AREA 
IN QUESTION UNLAWFUL FOR SIGNS 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6 (1995) (unchanged in material 
respects since the 1994 adoption of R933-2-3(4) (1994)) empowers 
UDOT to make rules to "control" outdoor advertising and provide 
"enforcement" of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. Pursuant to 
14 
that grant and the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, UDOT 
adopted rule R933-2-3(4) (1994) of the Utah Administrative Code 
after notice and opportunity for public comment and hearing. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-4 (1996 Supp.) and 63-46a-5 (1993). 
R933-2-3(4) (1994) is a "legislative rule".7 A "legislative rule 
has the same binding effect as a statute. It binds members of 
the public, the agency, and even the courts, in the sense that 
courts must affirm a legislative rule as long as it represents a 
valid exercise of agency authority." Davis & Pierce, § 6.3. 
The rule does not have any retroactive effect upon Kunz. At 
least from the time of the February, 1993 UDOT Order on Remand, 
it has been illegal to have signs at the location in issue. 
7
 Many legislative rules "interpret" statutory 
language, in the sense that they announce the 
agency's construction of a statute it has 
responsibility to administer. A rule that 
performs that interpretative function is a 
legislative rule rather than an interpretative 
rule if the agency has the statutory authority to 
promulgate a legislative rule and the agency 
exercises that power. Some legislative rules go 
much further than adopting a construction of a 
statute, of course. Some legislative rules impose 
new obligations through exercise of legislative 
authority delegated by statute. 
Kenneth C. Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law 
Treatise. § 6.3 (3rd ed. 1994). (Hereafter Davis & Pierce). 
15 
Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769-70 (holding that "Kunz is bound by the UDOT 
Order on Remand" and that the signs are "illegal"). The 1994 
administrative rule was made after that 1993 UDOT Order holding 
the signs unlawful and before Kunz obtained any valid permits (it 
still has none), and therefore that rule does not retroactively 
divest Kunz of any rights, including rights to sign permits. 
UDOT did raise the "ambiguity" of the statute below. (R. 
708-09.) The ambiguity arises from the ellipsis in the phrase in 
§ 27-12-136.3(3), "areas zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising." To make the grammatical structure 
complete one could read it "areas [that werel zoned . . . , " or 
"areas [that are] zoned . . . " If one reads it "areas [that are] 
zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising," 
the focus shifts from any specific action that was taken when the 
zoning was initiated and the time past when that occurred, to the 
purpose presently served by the zoning and the present statutes. 
Reading the phrase in this latter sense is consistent with the 
Court of Appeals' directive to the lower court to consider 
present "actual land uses" in its factual inquiry. In view of 
this ambiguity, UDOT appropriately adopted clarifying rule R933-
16 
2-3(4), that recognizes both senses of the phrase, pursuant to 
its statutory authority and duty. 
Contrary to Kunz's assertion, the phraseology of the UDOT 
Order on Remand was consistent with the latter sense of the 
statute and the rule. That phraseology is as follows: "[T]he 
zoning as !commercial! is, 'for the primary purpose of allowing 
outdoor advertising . . . ." (emphasis added.) (R. 215.) And 
UDOT has consistently so argued throughout the proceedings. 
(See, e.g., R. 1054 -- the "actual land use . . . shows the 
purpose served by the zoning.11) 
Kunz argues that the rule contradicts the statute. This is 
not true; it clarified Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995). 
At the very least, rule R933-2-3(4) can be taken as creating a 
very strong presumption that where the primary (or even more, 
only) activity on the land the signs are on is outdoor 
advertising, that advertising is unlawful. In view of the 
argument Kunz makes in favor of a very broad scope of inquiry at 
the remand trial and its introduction at the remand trial for the 
first time of the Toquerville ordinance, administrative rule 
R933-2-3(4) (1994) should be applied to perpetuate the 
17 
unlawfulness of this area for signs. 
IV. KUNZ MISSTATES THIS COURT'S REMAND INSTRUCTION, 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS DO 
NOT SATISFY THAT INSTRUCTION, AND THE RECORD 
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
This Court's remand is not "in effect a mandate to review 
the Toguerville planning process." (Kunz's brief, p. 22.) The 
remand instruction is what it is, and is reported and matched to 
the evidence in UDOT's opening brief. 
UDOT never urged the lower court not to consider the factors 
identified by this Court. UDOT objected to evidence that arises 
from certain unreliable circumstances and sources, based on law 
it cited to the Court. (R. 737-40) . The District Court having 
admitted and considered Kunz's submissions, UDOT urges only that 
its submissions and arguments be admitted and considered on a 
level playing field. The lower court's failure on remand to 
follow a specific instruction of the remanding court is a breach 
of the law of the case and is a question of law. Slattery v. 
Covev & Co.. Inc., 909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995) . The District 
Court's findings do not meet this Court's remand instructions and 
the judgment should be reversed. 
Whether the lower court received evidence and testimony 
18 
regarding a matter says nothing about whether the court genuinely 
considered it. That becomes apparent only in the court's 
findings and conclusions. UDOT's opening brief details the 
dispositive omissions and flaws in those findings and 
conclusions. Kunz's factors A through G do not support the 
District Court's findings or judgment. 
A. ANNEXATION AT EVELETH'S REQUEST. There is no reference 
in the District Court's findings to a petition for annexation. 
The general existence of a petition is not relevant anyway. What 
is relevant about the annexation process, however, is that the 
sole initiating force for adding the portion of land the signs 
were on to the land originally proposed for annexation was Mr. 
Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were on and the lessor 
of that portion to Kunz. This is established by the specific and 
uncontradicted testimony of Kimball Wallace, the Toquerville city 
engineer, quoted and discussed in UDOT's opening brief. 
Appellant's Br. at 30-32. Without that Toquerville annexation, 
the signs would be unlawful without more as part of Washington 
County, under the UDOT Order on Remand this Court held bound Kunz 
by res judicata. Kunz, 913 P.2d 769. 
19 
B. ACTUAL LAND USE/LACK OF COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT. It was 
patent error for the trial court to disregard as irrelevant 
"actual land use," the first factor this Court directed the lower 
court to consider. Id. Indeed, the most probative evidence 
presented at the trial was the absence of any commercial 
development (other than the signs) in the naturally beautiful 
area of the signs. Yet the trial court recited its findings of 
fact and stated its conclusion of law before it made any 
reference to actual land use. (R. 1065-67). And the after-
thought, hypothetical, reference the District Court did make to 
actual land use renders it clear the court did not consider that 
use in reaching its conclusion. The record reflects that 
reference as follows: 
But if it were left to the Court to determine to 
which use this property had been placed, the only 
conclusion that the Court could come to on the basis of 
this record is that the only use that this property has 
ever had during the times pertinent 1987 to date has 
been the maintenance of outdoor advertising. 
(R. 1067-68, emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals identified the first factor for 
consideration to be "actual land use," and then the lower court 
says, "if it were left to the Court to determine to which use 
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this property had been placed . . . ." There is no "if" about 
it. That determination was left to the trial court, it was 
central to disposition of the case, by this court's instruction, 
it was disregarded by the lower court, and the lower court's 
failure to rely on it is reversible error. 
C. "PROPOSED" LAND USES. This Court directed consideration 
of "actual land use," not "potential" land use. Kunz, 913 P.2d 
at 769. In any event, there was no finding or even testimony to 
the effect that anyone has ever had any interest in placing 
commercial activity in the area of the signs, 2,000 to 3,000 feet 
from the intersection. 
D. PERPETUATION OF WASHINGTON COUNTY ZONING DESIGNATION. 
The District Court entered no finding regarding Toquerville's 
perpetuation of the Washington County zoning, despite the Court 
of Appeals' explicit indication that perpetuation of the 
Washington County zoning, under which the area was illegal for 
signs, was a factor to consider. Id. UDOT has taken the 
position that the District Court did not need further evidence on 
the question whether Toquerville perpetuated the Washington 
County zoning that was illegal for signs, because this Court has 
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already found that "Toquerville . . . chose to retain the 
'highway commercial' zoning for the area." id. at 767. However, 
if the further evidence received on that factor is considered 
necessary or useful, it further supports the conclusion that 
Toquerville perpetuated Washington County's zoning. 
Mr. Peterson may not have been aware of the Washington 
County zoning, but the Toquerville Planner, Mr. Sizemore, was 
aware of it. (R. 892, 902). Most significantly, the only witness 
who actually voted on the Toquerville zoning, Mayor Wahlquist, 
testified that "Toquerville left the zoning of the Eveleth land 
the signs are on just as it was when the land was only in the 
county." (R. 985; Appellant's Br. at 26-30). This perpetuation 
of the Washington County zoning that was unlawful for signs 
supports unlawfulness of the area for signs. 
E. NO UTILITIES OR INFRASTRUCTURE. The District Court did 
find there was no utility or infrastructure in the area of the 
signs. (R. 768, f 5 -- "There is no evidence of any utility ever 
servicing the property - water, power, gas, sanitary sewer or 
other utilities"). This finding is supported by the record and 
supports the conclusion the zoning was not for commerce other 
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than the signs. The District Court inexplicably considered that 
irrelevant, tossing it off as an after-thought, after already 
having rendered its legal conclusion. (R. 1067). 
F. SIGNAGE ISSUES. The relevant aspects of the signage 
issues, that show illegality of the signs, are discussed in 
UDOT's opening brief. Again, Toquerville did have a sign 
ordinance at the time of the annexation and zoning. Appellee's 
Br., Addendum 6. 
G. LACK OF EVIDENCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS UNDER 
TOQUERVILLE ORDINANCE. The finding upon which the District Court 
based its judgment -- that Toquerville must have issued 
conditional use permits for the signs because the Toquerville 
ordinance required conditional use permits for signs of this type 
-- was based on thin air. There was no evidence of any 
conditional use permits since none had ever been issued. 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 6-7, 11-13. Moreover, this factor is 
irrelevant to the ultimate issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The central finding of the trial court based on nonexistent 
Toquerville conditional use permits is clearly erroneous. The 
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findings of the trial court are erroneous as a matter of law as 
to those factors it failed to consider in disregard of this 
Court's explicit instructions. The findings do not show that the 
trial court's judgment follows logically from and is supported by 
the evidence, and therefore the judgment should be reversed. The 
record reflects that the immediate area of the sign, as an area 
that is zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising, is not part of a "commercial or industrial zone" 
under the statute or rule, and outdoor advertising in that area 
is therefore unlawful. This Court should so hold. 
DATED this < H day of August, 1997. 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON * 
Assistant Attorney General 
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